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PROFESSIONALS, POLITICOS, AND CRONY
ATTORNEYS GENERAL: A HISTORICAL
SKETCH OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL
AS A CASE FOR STRUCTURAL INDEPENDENCE
Jed Handelsman Shugerman*
INTRODUCTION
When you get to the White House there are two jobs you must lock up—
Attorney General and director of the Internal Revenue Service.
—Joe Kennedy, Sr. to John F. Kennedy, perhaps apocryphally1

Historically, the office of the U.S. Attorney General has been identified as
“quasi-judicial” or having “quasi-judicial” aspects.2 Other parts of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) have also been described as quasi-judicial, such
as the Office of Legal Counsel and the Solicitor General.3 A glance at a list
of past attorneys general seems to confirm this judicial aspiration in practice.
Nine attorneys general became U.S. Supreme Court justices,4 and others
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Bruce Green
for organizing the Colloquium and providing terrific feedback. I would like to thank Jeremy
Adelman, Corey Brettschneider, Sueann Caulfield, Kathleen Clark, Julio César Guanche,
Andrew Kent, Jennifer Mascott, Asha Rangappa, Rebecca Roiphe, Rebecca Scott, Jeremy
Stahl, and Steve Vladeck. John M. Shaw and Gail McDonald provided outstanding research
assistance, and Michael Nester and Lauren Gorab provided excellent editing. I also thank
Danya Handelsman for her thoughtfulness and support. This Article was prepared for the
Colloquium entitled The Varied Roles, Regulation, and Professional Responsibilities of
Government Lawyers, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and
Ethics on October 12, 2018, at Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the
Colloquium, see Bruce A. Green, Lawyers in Government Service—a Foreword, 87 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1791 (2019).
1. LARRY TYE, BOBBY KENNEDY 458 n.133 (2016) (citing MICHAEL BESCHLOSS, THE
CRISIS YEARS: KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV, 1960–1963, at 302 (1991)); John P. Roche, The
Second Coming of R.F.K., NAT’L REV., July 22, 1988, at 32, 34.
2. See CALEB CUSHING, A REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUGGESTING
MODIFICATIONS IN THE MANNER OF CONDUCTING THE LEGAL BUSINESS OF THE GOVERNMENT:
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 33-55, at 6 (1854)
[hereinafter CUSHING REPORT]; see also Caleb Cushing, Office and Duties of the Attorney
General, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 334 (1854) [hereinafter Cushing Opinion]. Cushing also noted
that Congress established the Office of the Attorney General “in organizing the judicial
business of the United States.” Cushing Opinion, supra, at 330.
3. See Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805, 815 (2017).
4. The attorneys general who became Supreme Court justices were: Roger Taney,
Nathan Clifford, Joseph McKenna, William Moody, James McReynolds, Harlan Fiske Stone,
Frank Murphy, Robert Jackson, and Tom Clark. See Attorneys General of the United States,
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were notably judicious and professional in their tenure in the office.5 Of
course, there are some infamous examples of unprofessional cronyism—the
appointment of friends or associates to positions of authority, without
properly considering their qualifications—but there are famous
counterexamples of those who stood up to the presidents they served in
defense of legal principles. The “insider” friend, fixer, or brother of the
president was presumably the exception.
But a closer examination of the history of the Office of the Attorney
General reveals a surprising pattern: the nineteenth century had relatively
few crony-ist appointments in an era known for patronage, but the twentieth
century ushered in more partisan insiders, hacks, and fixers,6 just as the
DOJ’s power grew enormously.7 This shift was remarkably bipartisan,
starting under President Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, and then continuing
immediately after under President Warren G. Harding, a Republican.8
Perhaps this turn in the late 1910s started an era of partisan escalation as each
political party pushed the norms as they rotated into power. This Article
suggests that these trends have contributed to making the DOJ partisan and
allowing some presidents to imagine the Attorney General as the president’s
personal lawyer and fixer. In just over half of the past century, the Office of
the Attorney General has been filled by a partisan insider.
This research revealed a number of especially surprising patterns. First,
nineteenth-century America is known for the rise of the patronage party
system. Formal professionalization—especially legal professionalization—
emerged somewhat late in the nineteenth century.9 Nevertheless, there were
relatively few crony or patronage attorneys general in an era of patronage
without professionalization or recently emerging professionalization.
Second, the Progressive Era (roughly 1900 to 1920) is thought of as an era
of reforming the partisan machine, of anti-patronage, and of anti-corruption.
Yet, the rise of the crony or partisan campaign-insider Attorney General
began in the Progressive Era under President Woodrow Wilson and escalated
from there, including in the Roosevelt administration, which was also
perceived as a shift to administrative expertise (e.g., the “Brain Trust”) or at
least a team of established politicos.10 The third surprise is just how
DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ag/historical-bios?sort_by=field_dates_service_value2
&sort_order=ASC [https://perma.cc/5RDK-HU83] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) (providing
biographies for each attorney general, including those who became Supreme Court justices).
5. These include Edmund Randolph, William Wirt, Caleb Cushing, William M. Evarts,
Ebenezer R. Hoar, Homer Cummings, William Rogers, and Elliot Richardson. Id.
6. For a shorter version, see Jed Shugerman, Think Matthew Whitaker Is a Hack? He’s
One of Many, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/thinkmatthew-whitaker-is-a-hack-hes-one-of-many/2018/11/16/5efbf47c-e8f7-11e8-b8dc-66cca
409c180_story.html [https://perma.cc/B9A5-M88N].
7. See generally Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of
Justice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 170
(2014).
8. Id. at 170 n.277.
9. See id. at 121.
10. See id. at 170 n.277.
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bipartisan the cronyism of the Attorney General has been in the twentieth
century. Democrats accounted for more of the partisan insiderism of the midtwentieth century, though the party balance has shifted toward the
Republicans decisively since the Nixon-Reagan era.11 The nepotism of the
Kennedy administration with brother-protector Bobby Kennedy and the
corruption of the Nixon administration are most famous to modern observers,
but the origins go further back to a time perceived to be more progressive
and professional.
In Part I, this Article presents an overview of that pattern among attorneys
general, using the rough categories of “professional,” “politico,” and
“insider” or “crony,” based on their background and how they became
Attorney General rather than based upon their performance in the office.
This Part highlights some major turning points toward cronyism during the
Progressive Era: President Wilson’s Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer
and President Harding’s Attorney General Harry Daugherty. This focus will
highlight how that rise of cronyism contributed to the abuses and corruption
under those two attorneys general. Part II offers a preview of a historical
critique of the unitary-executive theory on prosecution, exemplified in
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson,12 a position that would prevent
many structural reforms.13 That position seems to be incorrect in its
historical assumptions.14 Part III offers some preliminary suggestions for
structural reform of the Office of the Attorney General and other parts of the
DOJ, borrowing from the independent agency model, while remaining
consistent with Article II’s Take Care and Vesting Clauses.15 The
breakdown of the norms of prosecutorial independence from partisanship is
not a new phenomenon; it is a century in the making. The solutions borrow
from some models that have grown elsewhere in the executive branch over
that same century.
I. PROFESSIONALS, POLITICOS, AND PATRONAGE INSIDERS
I went through the list of every Attorney General who served at least one
year, plus a few more with shorter but significant tenures, and excluded
11. To illustrate this point, see infra Table 1 (listing every attorney general who served at
least one year, with some exceptions, and categorizing each attorney general’s rise to the
office).
12. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
13. Id. at 696–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This Colloquium Article is a preview of
historical arguments on the executive, prosecution, and Morrison v. Olson that will be
developed more fully in a future article.
14. See Jed Shugerman, Stare Scalia, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2018), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/04/republican-senators-obsession-with-antonin-scalia-is-leading-them-tomake-sloppy-mistakes.html [https://perma.cc/MW43-U4CF]. This Article draws from that
short article and sketches the historical argument, which will be laid out in more detail in a
future article.
15. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 3. For new historical research on the
Take Care Clause as limiting presidential discretion by the original meaning of “faithful
execution,” see Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution
and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2019).

1968

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

acting attorneys general, except for Matthew Whitaker, whose appointment
came at a particularly significant moment and was especially salient for this
study. I checked their backgrounds to get a basic understanding of how these
individuals rose to the office. Three categories emerged. First was the
politico, a major elected official with established political clout, often as a
sitting member of Congress. Sometimes the dynamic is “Team of Rivals,”16
and sometimes it is party team player. But the salient feature is that this
Attorney General had his or her independent electoral base of power and an
already-established name. Second was the professional, a lawyer who had
established himself or herself in private practice, government service, or in
the judiciary. Sometimes they are veterans from the DOJ or get promoted
from within the DOJ. If they had held elected office, it was brief or less
prominent. They brought a reputation for skill to the office more than a
reputation for power. The third category was the insider, a friend or direct
supporter of the president who rises to power substantially because of his
connection to the president or the president’s political faction. I sometimes
use the word “crony” to describe these attorneys general, but that label is
sometimes too pejorative. Once in office, some of these insider attorneys
general would turn out to be more professional and independent, while others
are simply fixers who get embroiled in scandal.
The first two models, the politico and the professional, dominate from the
late eighteenth through the nineteenth century. The insider model pops up
under Presidents Andrew Jackson and Ulysses Grant during Reconstruction,
which should not shock students of either Jackson or Grant.17 But the 1870s
are surprising given that the Republicans created the DOJ in 1870 to promote
professionalization and limit patronage.18 The rest of the century returned to
the professional-politico balance. Then the early twentieth century shifts
back to insiders gradually and then overtakes the other models in the midtwentieth century. After a post-Watergate return to the professional model,
the last few decades have been a mix of all three.
Table 1, below, provides a quick overview, using “X” to signify the most
salient category (or, in some cases, two categories that are equally salient)
for each Attorney General and “*” to signify a secondary category where
appropriate. With regard to political party designation, “F” indicates
Federalist, “D-R” indicates Democratic-Republican, “D” indicates
Democrat, “W” indicates Whig, and “R” indicates Republican. Table 1 omits
all but one acting attorney general and attorneys general with short,
16. See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS xvi (2005) (“It soon became clear,
however, that Abraham Lincoln would emerge the undisputed captain of this most unusual
cabinet, truly a team of rivals. The powerful competitors who had originally disdained Lincoln
became colleagues who helped him steer the country through its darkest days.” (emphasis
added)).
17. See Shugerman, supra note 7, at 124, 144 n.138.
18. See id. at 121 (“The founding of the DOJ had less to do with Reconstruction, and more
to do with ‘retrenchment’ (budget cutting and anti-patronage reform). The DOJ’s creation
was linked with major professionalization efforts . . . to make the practice of law more
exclusive and more independent from partisan politics.”).
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insignificant tenures, and it is followed by a short description of each of the
insiders or cronies.
Table 1: U.S. Attorneys General 1789–2019
Attorney General
Edmund Randolph
William Bradford
Charles Lee
Levi Lincoln
John Breckinridge
Caesar Rodney
William Pinkney
Richard Rush
William Wirt
John M. Berrien
Roger B. Taney
Benjamin Franklin
Butler
Felix Grundy
Henry D. Gilpin
Hugh S. Legaré
John Nelson
John Y. Mason
Nathan Clifford
Reverdy Johnson
John J.
Crittenden19
Caleb Cushing
Jeremiah S. Black
Edward Bates
James Speed
Henry Stanbery
William M. Evarts

Tenure
1789–94
1794–95
1795–1801
1801–05
1805–06
1807–11
1811–14
1814–17
1817–29
1829–31
1831–33

Party
F
F
F
D-R
D-R
D-R
D-R
F
D-R
D
D

1833–38

D

1838–40
1840–41
1841–43
1843–45
1845–46
1846–48
1849–50

D
D
D
W
D
D
W

1850–53

W

1853–57
1857–60
1861–64
1864–66
1866–68
1868–69

D
D
R
R
R
R

Professional

Politico

Insider/
Crony

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

*

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

19. Crittenden was close to Zachary Taylor, but he was the quintessential politico, having
served two terms in the U.S. Senate, an additional two years of another Senate term, a term as
Governor of Kentucky, and a short earlier stint as the U.S. Attorney General in 1841. He did
not get his position as a crony insider. Paul Finkelman, Crittenden, John J. (1787–1863),
ENCYCLOPEDIA AM. CONST., http://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/encyclopedias-almanacstranscripts-and-maps/crittenden-john-j-1787-1863 [https://perma.cc/7M2N-3HFD] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2019); Crittenden, John Jordan, (1787–1863), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY
U.S.
CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000912
[https://perma.cc/379Q-NC3F] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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Attorney General
Ebenezer R. Hoar
Amos T. Akerman
George Henry
Williams
Edwards
Pierrepont
Alphonso Taft
Charles Devens
Benjamin H.
Brewster
Augustus Garland
William H. H.
Miller
Richard Olney
Judson Harmon
Joseph McKenna
John W. Griggs
Philander C. Knox
William Henry
Moody
Charles Bonaparte
George W.
Wickersham
James C.
McReynolds
Thomas Watt
Gregory
A. Mitchell
Palmer
Harry M.
Daugherty
Harlan F. Stone
John G. Sargent
William D.
Mitchell
Homer Stille
Cummings
Frank Murphy
Robert H. Jackson
Francis Biddle
Tom C. Clark
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Politico

Insider/
Crony

X

X

Party

Professional

1869–70
1870–71

R
R

X
X

1871–75

R

1875–76

R

X

1876–77
1877–81

R
R

X
X

1881–85

R

X

1885–89

D

1889–93

R

1893–95
1895–97
1897–98
1898–1901
1901–04

D
D
R
R
R

1904–06

R

X

1906–09

R

X

1909–13

R

X

1913–14

D

X

1914–19

D

X

1919–21

D

X

1921–24

R

X

1924–25
1925–29

R
R

X

1929–33

R

X

1933–39

D

X

1939–40
1940–41
1941–45
1945–49

D
D
D
D

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
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Attorney General
J. Howard
McGrath
James P.
McGranery
Herbert
Brownell Jr.
William P. Rogers
Robert F. Kennedy
Nicholas
Katzenbach
Ramsey Clark
John N. Mitchell
Richard
Kleindienst
Elliot Richardson
William B. Saxbe
Edward H. Levi
Griffin Bell
Benjamin Civiletti
William French
Smith
Edwin Meese
Dick Thornburgh
William Barr
Janet Reno
John Ashcroft
Alberto Gonzales
Michael Mukasey
Eric Holder
Loretta Lynch
Jeff Sessions
Matthew Whitaker
(Acting)
William Barr

CRONY ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Tenure

Party

Professional

1949–52

D

1952–53

D

1953–57

R

1957–61
1961–64

R
D

X

1964–66

D

X

1966–69
1969–72

D
R

X

1972–73

R

1973
1974–75
1975–77
1977–79
1979–81

R
R
R
D
D

X
X
X

1981–85

R

X

1985–88
1988–91
1991–93
1993–2001
2001–05
2005–07
2007–09
2009–15
2015–17
2017–18

R
R
R
D
R
R
R
D
D
R

2018–19

R

2019–
Present

R

1971
Politico

Insider/
Crony
X

X
X
X

X
X
*

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

For just over half of the past century, the Attorney General of the United
States has fit more in the partisan-insider mold than the professional or the
politico molds. As this trend increased throughout the twentieth century,
both sides eroded norms of political independence. Presidents Wilson and
Harding touched off a new round of cronyism from opposing parties; the
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cronyism then continued, alternating parties with Presidents Hoover,
Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, W.
Bush, and then Trump.
Let us touch on each of these political operators to get a glimpse of their
path to the office. Was it a professional path, a path of political power, or an
inside track?
The first of the insiders was Roger Taney, the Attorney General under
Andrew Jackson. Taney had been a minor political figure in Maryland (a
state senator, then a county bank director) until he hitched himself to
Jackson.20 In the fractured election of 1824, Taney became an “ardent
Jacksonian.”21 When the split electoral college vote led to a House vote,
Taney lobbied Maryland’s members of Congress to vote for Jackson. This
alliance helped get him appointed as Maryland Attorney General, and then
as chairman of the Jackson Central Committee of Maryland and an organizer
of his political convention in Baltimore as part of his successful 1828
campaign.22 Taney finished his term as Maryland Attorney General, then
became Jackson’s acting Secretary of War and Attorney General from 1831
to 1833.23 One of his biographers concludes, “No one as politically astute as
General Jackson could have been ignorant of one who had taken such a
prominent part on his behalf.”24 Taney then served as a close advisor and an
advocate for Jackson as his Attorney General. After the Senate rejected
Taney’s nomination for Treasury Secretary, Jackson fought for a year to
make him chief justice of the Supreme Court, an office he held for twentyeight years, up through the Court’s monumental decision in Dred Scott v.
Sandford,25 and most of the Civil War.
Benjamin Butler followed Taney immediately as Attorney General and
followed in his patronage footsteps.26 Butler had joined the Albany Regency,
Martin Van Buren’s Democratic Party movement turned political machine in
the 1810s.27 He advanced up through the party from Albany district attorney
to state assemblyman.28 Jackson plucked him out of the state assembly to
20. Attorney General: Roger Brooke Taney, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
ag/bio/taney-roger-brooke [https://perma.cc/U4SV-CJEE] (last updated July 7, 2017).
21. NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 67 (1992).
22. Roger Brooke Taney (1777–1864), DICK. C. ARCHIVES & SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
(2005), http://archives.dickinson.edu/people/roger-brooke-taney-1777-1864 [http://perma.cc/
P762-QD4E].
23. Id.
24. WALKER LEWIS, WITHOUT FEAR OF FAVOR: A BIOGRAPHY OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER
BROOKE TANEY 122 (1965).
25. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
26. See Shugerman, supra note 7, at 146 (noting that, even when he was a congressman,
Butler was “a Radical who had a reputation for protecting political patronage”).
27. Arthur A. Ekirch Jr., Benjamin F. Butler of New York: A Personal Portrait, 58 N.Y.
HIST., Jan. 1977, at 47, 53 (“He was now also one of the valued, though junior, members of
Van Buren’s famed Albany Regency. This informal but politically potent group of
advisers . . . were part of the Bucktail faction of the Democratic Republican Party.”).
28. Attorney General: Benjamin Franklin Butler, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
ag/bio/butler-benjamin-franklin [https://perma.cc/6TRZ-M5ZE] (last updated July 7, 2017).
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serve as Attorney General, surely serving the request of his Vice President
Van Buren.29 But the Jackson-Van Buren era of patronage was a short phase
in terms of the Attorney General’s office.
The Civil War and Reconstruction brought back some of this patronage.
James Speed’s brother Joshua was President Lincoln’s closest friend from
Illinois, and James had been a close friend of Lincoln’s since 1841 while
building a modest law practice and teaching.30 He won a seat in the Kentucky
Senate in 1861, and then ascended to the Attorney General’s office.31
After Lincoln’s assassination, President Andrew Johnson’s administration
was chaotic and marked by dramatic conflicts, both internally and with
Congress over Reconstruction.32 Johnson’s Attorney General, Henry
Stanbery, was a strange choice—a relatively insignificant lawyer and big
player in Ohio politics. He had been Attorney General of Ohio from 1846 to
1851 but then was seemingly out of politics for fifteen years.33 Johnson
plucked him out of obscurity, and he must have found something wildly
appealing because he first tried to appoint Stanbery as chief justice of the
Supreme Court.34 Looking at Stanbery’s thin record, this is not only stunning
to the historian in hindsight, but it was also a surprise to the Republican
Senate.35 The Senate rejected the nomination, mostly due to its opposition
to Johnson and his hostility to Reconstruction.36 In response, Johnson
nominated Stanbery for Attorney General.37 When U.S. attorneys tried to
enforce civil rights laws in Kentucky, Stanbery cut them off.38 When
Johnson was impeached, Stanbery served as his defense counsel.39 Johnson
seemed to have gotten what he was looking for in Stanbery: fierce loyalty.
The Grant era started off with a remarkable set of professionals: William
M. Evarts, Ebenezer R. Hoar, and Amos T. Akerman. The New York Times
reported that Akerman, a Georgia district attorney, was a “Universal
Surprise.”40 Congress created the DOJ at this time.41 The traditional view
29. Id.; see also Ekirch, supra note 27, at 58.
30. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 88, 299 (1995).
31. James Speed, FILSON HIST. SOC’Y, https://filsonhistorical.org/james-speed/
[https://perma.cc/NZ7Q-TCH7] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
32. Shugerman, supra note 7, at 144–45 (listing various conflicts that arose between
President Johnson’s administration and Congress).
33. Henry Stanbery (1866–1868), MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/president/
johnson/essays/stanbery-1866-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/TCZ6-VKWX] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2019).
34. Id.
35. Erick Trickey, The History of “Stolen Supreme Court Seats,” SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/history-stolen-supreme-courtseats-180962589/ [https://perma.cc/Z6G7-YF32].
36. Henry Stanbery (1866–1868), supra note 33; see also Trickey, supra note 35.
37. Henry Stanbery (1866–1868), supra note 33; see also Trickey, supra note 35.
38. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876, at 38–40 (1985).
39. Henry Stanbery (1866–1868), supra note 33.
40. Talk at the Capital About the Resignation of Mr. Hoar, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1870,
http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1870/06/17/87592028.pdf [http://perma.cc/
4JKB-NMD3].
41. Shugerman, supra note 7, at 122.
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had been that Congress created the DOJ to increase the federal government’s
capacity to litigate a growing docket due to the Civil War and to enforce
Reconstruction and civil rights.42 To the contrary, it was really an effort to
shrink and professionalize the federal government.43 The creation of the DOJ
was linked with major professionalization efforts, such as the founding of
modern bar associations, to make the practice of law more exclusive and
more independent from partisan politics.44 The DOJ was created to promote
the norms and structures of professional independence.45 But after the DOJ’s
first Attorney General, Akerman, followed this aspiration, his successor
George Williams was more of a Grant crony.
Williams was a senator who had been supportive of military
Reconstruction, but by the 1870s, he had lost interest.46 President Grant may
have appointed Williams not for his help in a civil rights campaign, but rather
for his help on Grant’s 1872 reelection campaign.47 Then Williams cut back
on civil rights enforcement.48 Edwards Pierrepont followed Williams, and
his role can be categorized as a mix of professional and insider. Pierrepont
had been the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, a
significant position then as it is now.49 But what distinguished Pierrepont
was his prominent and enthusiastic support of President Grant in the election
campaign of 1872. He gave a major campaign speech for Grant at the Cooper
Union in New York, the same location as one of Abraham Lincoln’s famous
speeches,50 and then traveled around New York, attacking the Democrats’
Tammany Ring.51 Pierrepont, a former Democrat, had led the prosecution
of Tammany Hall, which was the patronage machine controlling New York
City.52 It was apparently his campaigning for Grant and prosecution of
Democratic leaders that put Pierrepont in line for Attorney General.
Pierrepont continued Williams’s moratorium on prosecuting civil rights
cases to protect former slaves, but he tried to combat corruption in the
administration and in the Whiskey Ring.53 A rumor spread that he had
42. Id. at 121.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 123–24.
45. Id. at 125.
46. Id. at 144 n.138; see also KACZOROWSKI, supra note 38, at 76, 86.
47. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 38, at 80–81.
48. Id. at 85–87.
49. Attorney General: Edwards Pierrepont, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/
edwards-pierrepont [https://perma.cc/YEV2-APBA] (last updated July 5, 2017).
50. See Edwards Pierrepont, Speech of the Hon. Edwards Pierrepont, Delivered Before
the Republican Mass Meeting, at Cooper Institute (Sept. 25, 1872).
51. See Bruce A. Kimball & R. Blake Brown, “The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”:
Langdell on Wall Street, 1855–1870, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 93 (2004).
52. Hon. Edwards Pierrepont on the Presidential and Gubernatorial Candidates Sound
Arguments for the Support of the Republican Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1872,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1872/10/31/83216185.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C4JS-KWG4].
53. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the
Second Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 667, 765 (2003); Edwards Pierrepont
(1875–1876), MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/president/grant/essays/pierrepont-1875attorney-general [https://perma.cc/M4Y8-HKP3] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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violated his professional duties by helping a defendant in the corruption
cases.54 Ultimately, these tensions, along with coalition politics, led to his
departure.55
For the next forty years, there were no crony attorneys general other than
William Miller, who had been a close advisor to Benjamin Harrison.56 The
1910s, however, were a turning point. President Woodrow Wilson’s
Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer, famous for the “Palmer Raids” during
the Red Scare, had served as a congressman for only four years—not long
enough to be a major congressional figure.57 More importantly, he also was
a deft patronage manager and later made connections while serving on the
Democratic National Committee. He was known as a party insider.
Although he did not support Wilson initially in 1912, once Palmer
understood that Pennsylvania Democrats were going to back Wilson, Palmer
shifted enthusiastically to a “committed champion”58 for Wilson and was
then “inducted into the inner circle of Wilson’s preconvention advisers.”59
Palmer helped Wilson win the decisive Pennsylvania primary and then
became Wilson’s floor leader in the contested 1912 Democratic convention,
sacrificing some of his own political capital to help Wilson win the
nomination.60 He wanted to be Attorney General more than anything else
but lost out to a more “professional” figure, James C. McReynolds.
McReynolds also happened to be a close friend of one of Wilson’s most
trusted advisors and mentors, Colonel Edward House,61 who disliked
Palmer.62 Palmer remained in Congress, then lost his race for the Senate in
1914.63 Now out of Congress, Palmer campaigned vigorously for Wilson’s
reelection in 1916.64

54. Attorney General Pierrepont. Harmony Existing Between Himself and Secretary
Bristow—an Indignant Denial of the Statement That He Furnished Evidence to Counsel for
Defense in the Babcock Trial., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1876, at 1,
http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1876/03/07/81686814.html [http://perma.cc/
D8ED-3BXG].
55. See generally H. W. BRANDS, THE MAN WHO SAVED THE UNION (2012); RON
CHERNOW, GRANT (2017); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, GRANT (2001); 8 WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN LAW Pierrepont, Edwards (2005).
56. CHARLES W. CALHOUN, BENJAMIN HARRISON 63 (2005).
57. Attorney General: Alexander Mitchell Palmer, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
ag/bio/palmer-alexander-mitchell [https://perma.cc/X6KH-27V5] (last updated June 29,
2017).
58. BAKER, supra note 21, at 109.
59. STANLEY COBEN, A. MITCHELL PALMER: POLITICIAN 53–57 (1963).
60. Id. at 58–60.
61. Donald Johnson, The Political Career of A. Mitchell Palmer, 25 PA. HIST., Oct. 1958,
at 345, 348–49.
62. Id. at 348. McReynolds, despite his bigotry, was considered an elite lawyer more than
an insider at the time, and I categorize him here accordingly, but I could reconsider upon
deeper study of him.
63. Palmer, Alexander Mitchell, HIST. ART & ARCHIVES U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES,
https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/19322 [https://perma.cc/8LHH-7T87] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2019).
64. COBEN, supra note 59, at 124–26.
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In the second Wilson administration, Palmer served first as Custodian of
the Office of Alien Property, a wartime role with massive power over
property and many opportunities to hand out jobs and access to that
property.65 And he did use his power to hire many political supporters to lay
a foundation for his own future political campaign, as he had his eyes on
running for president in 1920.66 He was never charged with corrupt seizure
of property, but his hires were, and he was blamed for irresponsible
supervision.67 In 1919, he finally got the job he had wanted for seven years:
he became Attorney General. Wilson’s private secretary counseled that the
Office of the Attorney General had “great power politically” and that “[w]e
should not trust it to any one who is not heart and soul with us.”68 It seems
clear that Wilson chose Palmer due to assurances about partisan loyalty. The
war was over, and the Red Scare of 1919 had begun. Palmer worked to
foment the Scare and feed the public’s panic about Communism, and he
immediately abused the office’s power to start a policy of mass arrests and
mass deportations.69 There were legitimate concerns: radicals had plotted
major assassinations for May 1, 1919, which were then exposed and
prevented.70 Palmer’s own house was bombed on June 2, 1919.71 Palmer
blamed immigrants rather than domestic sources.72 Palmer ordered raids on
Russian immigrants, which turned out to produce relatively small amounts
of evidence of radicalism and few deportations, but the newspapers loved the
raids.73 Palmer increased his crackdowns in 1920 and warned of even bigger
terror threats. But those warnings never led to any evidence, the Red Scare
was settling down, and the public eventually grew tired of Palmer’s selfpromoting fear-mongering. Newspapers turned against him, and the leading
legal minds of the time—Felix Frankfurter, Roscoe Pound, Zechariah
Chafee, and Ernst Freund, followed by Harlan Fiske Stone and Charles Evans
Hughes—condemned Palmer’s abuse of power.74 Nevertheless, he still
announced his campaign for president in 1920 with significant support.75 He
had a sizable number of delegates at the divided 1920 convention, and he

57.

65. 50 U.S.C. § 4306 (2012); Attorney General: Alexander Mitchell Palmer, supra note

66. See Johnson, supra note 61, at 362–63.
67. BAKER, supra note 21, at 110.
68. COBEN, supra note 59, at 150–54.
69. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 111–12.
70. Find More Bombs Sent in the Mails; One to Overman, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1919, at 1,
http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1919/05/02/98284623.pdf [http://perma.cc/
LS33-BUGQ].
71. Johnson, supra note 61, at 367.
72. See id. at 356–57.
73. BAKER, supra note 21, at 112.
74. Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: In Defense of Individual Freedom,
1918–20, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 147, 166–67 (1951); see also Johnson, supra note 61, at 363–64
(explaining how lawyers, like Frankfurter, Pound, Chafee, and Freund, exemplified more
frequent criticism of the mass Palmer raids to capture anarchists).
75. Johnson, supra note 61, at 363, 366 (“In spite of the attacks and exposures, Palmer’s
campaign was reasonably successful.”).
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stayed in through thirty-eight ballots before dropping out.76 This ended his
political career. Palmer’s tenure as Attorney General was marked by his
abuse of power to feed his political ambition.
Palmer’s tenure illustrates one reason why the Office of the Attorney
General became so politically salient: it built up tremendous power over
immigration, deportation, and national security over the twentieth century. It
is crucial to ensure that the president has sufficient command over those areas
and that the Attorney General is politically accountable.
The path from party loyalty to Attorney General escalated in the next
administration, which established a new norm: a president appointing his
campaign manager as head of the DOJ. Harry M. Daugherty and Warren G.
Harding had been close friends for twenty years—coming up through the
same faction of the Ohio Republican Party (the “Foraker faction” in the state
legislature).77 President William McKinley was from Ohio, and Daugherty
benefited from his close proximity to such power. In 1896, Daugherty had
been one of McKinley’s party insiders and convention managers.78 When
the Republican Party split between William Howard Taft and Theodore
Roosevelt in 1912, Daugherty and Harding backed Taft, their fellow Ohioan,
and played major roles in his campaign. Harding then won a seat in the U.S.
Senate in 1914, but Daugherty lost his shot in 1916,79 so Daugherty hitched
himself to Harding’s presidential ascendancy by serving as his campaign
manager.80
Harding won and appointed Daugherty—one of his “Ohio Gang”
insiders—Attorney General.81 The Ohio Gang then engineered one of the
most infamous corruption scandals in American history, the Teapot Dome
scandal. Daugherty was never directly linked to the scandal, but he could not
escape suspicions.82 In fact, Daugherty used his power and his officials to
retaliate against the members of Congress who were investigating him.83
During prohibition, two of his friends, whom he had hired for DOJ offices,
used their powers to remove seized liquor and sell it back on the street, sell
scarce government liquor permits, sell government jobs, engage in financial
fraud, and obstruct justice.84 Historians have suggested that Daugherty must
Daugherty also cracked down on railroad strikes
have known.85
aggressively, and criticism grew that he had been too punitive. The House
Judiciary Committee began impeachment hearings on fourteen grounds.86
76. Id. at 367.
77. JAMES N. GIGLIO, H. M. DAUGHERTY AND THE POLITICS OF EXPEDIENCY 82 (1978).
78. BAKER, supra note 21, at 115.
79. GIGLIO, supra note 77, at 81.
80. Id.
81. HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER 48 (1951).
82. Id. at 54.
83. BAKER, supra note 21, at 118.
84. Id.
85. Id.; GIGLIO, supra note 77, at 124–30, 135–37; ROBERT K. MURRAY, THE HARDING
ERA 432–33 (1969); C. VANN WOODWARD, RESPONSES OF THE PRESIDENTS TO CHARGES OF
MISCONDUCT 244–47 (1974).
86. BAKER, supra note 21, at 118–19.
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But then Harding died suddenly in 1923, and Calvin Coolidge became
president.87 Coolidge did not have any special connection to Daugherty, and
meanwhile, the Teapot Dome scandal grew worse as the 1924 election
approached.88 Coolidge had more than enough reason to force Daugherty’s
resignation in 1924.89
After the consummate professional Harlan Fiske Stone cleaned up this
mess in his one year as Attorney General, President Coolidge appointed his
friend from childhood, John Sargent.90 Sargent was a solid insurance lawyer
and had served in Vermont state government for two years under his cousin,
the governor, and then served for four years as Vermont’s Attorney
General.91 He was not exactly a national name.
Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman ushered in another round of insider
attorneys general. Homer Cummings was a prominent lawyer, a local leader
in Connecticut, and had been chair of the Democratic National Committee.92
After sitting out politics for decade, he returned to shepherd Roosevelt to the
Democratic nomination in 1932 as convention floor manager and strategist.93
When Roosevelt’s first choice for Attorney General died right before his
inauguration, he turned to Cummings.94 Cummings served as a loyal
manager and strategist for the New Deal and as the point person for
Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan of 1937.95 Robert Jackson was famously
professional in hindsight, but he, too, emerged from partisan insider
connections. When Roosevelt was governor, Jackson served on his state
commissions.96 He had been an early supporter of FDR and served as
chairman of Democratic Lawyers for Roosevelt.97 Jackson was a key liaison
during the campaign, became a close friend of Roosevelt’s, then rose up the
ranks of the DOJ to Attorney General.98 Tom Clark, in addition to being a
DOJ veteran professional, similarly ascended to Attorney General through
his well-known close friendship with President Truman.99 J. Howard
87. Id. at 119.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. FEDERAL WRITERS’ PROJECT, VERMONT: A GUIDE TO THE GREEN MOUNTAIN STATE
255 (1934).
91. Attorney General: John Garibaldi Sargent, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ag/
bio/sargent-john-garibaldi [https://perma.cc/Q49B-XR2R] (last updated June 29, 2017).
92. BAKER, supra note 21, at 21.
93. See id.
94. Homer S. Cummings (1933–1939), MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/president/
fdroosevelt/essays/cummings-1933-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/6T4R-DVXK] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2019).
95. Homer Cummings, Ex-U.S. Aide, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1956, at 35,
https://www.nytimes.com/1956/09/11/archives/homer-cummings-exus-aide-dies-attorneygeneral-193339-under.html [https://perma.cc/SU9W-JMLD].
96. JOHN F. STACK, AT WAR WITH CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 75 (2006).
97. A different Robert H. Jackson, of New Hampshire, served on the Democratic National
Committee as secretary in 1932, causing some biographical confusion. ROBERT H. JACKSON,
THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 227 n.8 (2003).
98. BAKER, supra note 21, at 78–79.
99. ALEXANDER WOHL, FATHER, SON AND CONSTITUTION—HOW JUSTICE TOM CLARK AND
ATTORNEY GENERAL RAMSEY CLARK SHAPED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 60–67 (2013).
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McGrath was national party chair for Truman’s uphill 1948 race and was
nominated the following year.100 Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nixon did the
same for their campaign managers: Herbert Brownell, Robert Kennedy, and
John Mitchell, respectively.101
Of course, Robert Kennedy and John Mitchell are especially famous cases
of nepotism and cronyism, but they each reflect the downhill fixation with
fixers in the twentieth century. A recent biography of Robert Kennedy
offered a striking narrative of how he made his way to Attorney General.
Larry Tye reports that Joseph P. Kennedy Sr., the Kennedy patriarch, had
been talking about having his son Jack as president and Bobby as Attorney
General for three years before the election.102 He wanted Bobby in the
cabinet to protect Jack. However, Bobby was just 35, and he had never
actually tried a case. Tye and Michael Beschloss offer a seemingly
apocryphal quotation from Joe Sr. to the future president: “When you get to
the White House there are two jobs you must lock up—Attorney General and
director of the Internal Revenue Service.”103
It turns out that this quotation comes from a National Review article in
1988, attributed to House Speaker John McCormack, so it should be taken
with a grain of salt.104 Bobby Kennedy continues to receive tremendous
credit for his professional work as Attorney General as well as his
commitment to civil rights and to national security issues. But it is worth
noting that the Kennedy family’s links to organized crime were never
investigated in these years.105
With respect to Joe Sr.’s influence, one biographer wrote:
On the appointment of the attorney general, Joseph Kennedy had the first
and last words. Driven by family pride and the desire to protect his personal
investments in all of his sons, the father had publicly ordained Robert for
the office in the 1956 Saturday Evening Post article. The family had
humorously bandied the idea about for several years. Eunice Kennedy
Shriver once playfully suggested that Robert be made attorney general “so
he can throw all the people Dad doesn’t like in jail. That means we’ll have
to build more jails.”106

Another biographer observed:
As a business tycoon who lived his own life on the edge of lawlessness, Joe
also grasped how useful it could be having America’s chief law
enforcement officer at his dinner table. . . . The capital teemed with the
enemies, both Republican and Democratic, that Jack had made during his

100. BAKER, supra note 21, at 21.
101. Id. at 20–21.
102. TYE, supra note 1, at 132.
103. Id. at 458 n.133.
104. Roche, supra note 1, at 34.
105. See, e.g., Tina Sinatra: Mob Ties Aided JFK, CBS NEWS (Oct. 5, 2000),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tina-sinatra-mob-ties-aided-jfk/
[https://perma.cc/J6FM4AA4].
106. JAMES W. HILTY, ROBERT KENNEDY: BROTHER PROTECTOR 186–87 (1997).
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swift climb to power, while skeletons continued to pile up in his bedroom
closet.107

These accounts reflect tremendous pressure from Joe Sr. on John to appoint
his brother as Attorney General.
When John eventually did, there was a wave of opposition from the public.
The New York Times called it “most disappointing,” and prominent Yale Law
Professor Alexander Bickel said he was “not fit for the office.”108 Robert
blamed his father, telling reporters it was “his father’s idea” and told them to
call his father with their concerns.109 Senators in confirmation hearings
pointed out that he had never tried a case and was remarkably inexperienced
even for his short ten years out of law school.110 But he was confirmed with
only one “no” vote, thanks to LBJ’s lobbying of his former colleagues.111
Robert immediately announced a “war on crime” against racketeering and
the mafia, building on his book The Enemy Within.112 Robert’s five-point
plan for combatting organized crime included expanding the DOJ’s
Organized Crime Section.113 And yet that plan never led to the Kennedy
family’s ties to organized crime. There were constant rumors of the Kennedy
family’s links to organized crime, John’s affair with a mafia party girl, and
their friend Frank Sinatra’s clear mafia ties, “all of which imperiled the
legitimacy and credibility of Kennedy’s anticrime program.”114 In fact,
Robert protected John from scrutiny: “Informed that [Sicilian gangster Sam]
Giancana frequently stayed at [Sinatra’s] home in Palm Springs, where the
president was scheduled to visit in March 1962, Robert insisted that his
brother make other arrangements.”115
Robert made sure to push Sinatra away from the Kennedy family,
protecting John but also limiting the investigations as well.116 Organized
crime figures mocked Robert as hypocritical and self-serving.117 The FBI
recorded gangster Vinnie Teresa saying, “[The Kennedys] used [Sinatra] to
help them raise money. Then they turn around and say they’re great fighters
against corruption. They criticize other people for being with mob guys.
They’re hypocrites.”118 The FBI investigation of the mob turned up evidence

107. TYE, supra note 1, at 133.
108. HILTY, supra note 106, at 190.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 191.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 197.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 204.
115. Id. at 207.
116. See Tina Sinatra: Mob Ties Aided JFK, supra note 105 (noting that the Sinatra and
Kennedy families attempted to limit the Kennedy family’s communication with the mafia even
before the Sinatra family asked Giancana and the mafia to deliver the West Virginia union
vote to John Kennedy).
117. See id. (explaining that the mafia was allegedly furious after delivering the union vote
to then-Senator John Kennedy because the Kennedy administration and DOJ began cracking
down on organized crime).
118. HILTY, supra note 106, at 208.
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of the president’s various affairs with mafia-connected women, but the FBI
buried these facts.119
Lyndon Johnson’s attorneys general were more in the professional model,
but Nixon’s were not. John Mitchell, a Nixon appointee, came out of
nowhere politically to befriend Nixon and run his 1968 and 1972 presidential
campaigns.120 In the first campaign, he allegedly subverted the Paris Peace
Accords, which had been progressing toward ending the Vietnam War.121
When Nixon won, he persuaded J. Edgar Hoover not to conduct a
background investigation of Mitchell as his Attorney General nominee.122
After three years as Attorney General, undercutting civil rights and civil
liberties, Mitchell resigned to become director of the Committee to Reelect
the President (popularly known as “CREEP”), was implicated in the
Watergate break-in, and was convicted of perjury and served nineteen
months in prison.123
Richard Kleindienst replaced Mitchell after he departed to run the 1972
campaign.124 Kleindienst had been Deputy Attorney General during the
federal government’s suit against International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.
(ITT).125 During Nixon’s first term, he and his advisor and coconspirator,
John Ehrlichman, had told Kleindienst to drop an antitrust suit against ITT,
one of his biggest campaign donors, from which Nixon wanted more
money.126 In 1971, Kleindienst obliged, cutting a favorable deal for ITT.127
Later, Kleindienst lied to Congress about the ITT case.128 The fact that he
119. Id.
120. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 20.
121. Kent G. Sieg, The 1968 Presidential Election and Peace in Vietnam, 26 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 1062, 1069–70 (1996).
122. CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 616 (2001) (“But when
Nixon told Hoover who the new AG would be, he did something unprecedented: he asked
that the FBI not conduct a background investigation on Mitchell.”).
123. See Lawrence Meyer, John N. Mitchell, Principal in Watergate, Dies at 75, WASH.
POST (Nov. 10, 1988), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/
stories/mitchobit.htm [https://perma.cc/J2WS-NJXQ]; Attorney General: John Newton
Mitchell, DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/mitchell-john-newton [http://perma.cc/
4K3U-E3DN] (last updated June 28, 2017).
124. Bart Barnes, Richard Kleindienst, Attorney General During Watergate, Dies, WASH.
POST (Feb. 4, 2000), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2000/02/04/richardkleindienst-attorney-general-during-watergate-dies/3fd8559d-4eff-41b8-8302-6404ff8d449f/
[https://perma.cc/QVD2-QPDH]; Attorney General: Richard Gordon Kleindienst, DEP’T
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/kleindienst-richard-gordon [https://perma.cc/Z2X8WVU2] (last updated June 28, 2017).
125. See Nicholas Gage, Nixon Reported to Have Ordered I.T.T. Settlement, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1973, at 1, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1973/10/30/
91022780.html [https://perma.cc/T4JK-KHVA].
126. See id.; Context of ‘1969: ITT Negotiates with Nixon Aides to Avoid Antitrust
Lawsuit,’ HIST. COMMONS, http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1969
ittlawsuit#a1969ittlawsuit [https://perma.cc/EF4P-FAC4] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
127. Context of ‘1969: ITT Negotiates with Nixon Aides to Avoid Antitrust Lawsuit,’ supra
note 126.
128. Anthony Marro, Prosecutors Sought Felony Case Against Kleindienst, Records Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1978, at 43, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/
1978/01/22/110774587.html [https://perma.cc/35JC-8LV5].
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was so cooperative with the president’s corruption—and so compromised—
made him a perfect Attorney General for Nixon, and in that role, Mitchell
returned to him for help to cover up Watergate.129 He resigned as the
Watergate scandal escalated in 1973.130 In 1974, he pleaded guilty to a minor
offense in connection with the case.131
Other Watergate lawyers also went to jail for conspiring to obstruct justice.
John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s counsel, was found guilty of conspiracy to
obstruct justice and perjury, and he served eighteen months in prison.132
Ehrlichman’s aide Egil Krogh had approved the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg’s
psychiatrist as part of Nixon’s reaction to the leak of the Pentagon Papers,
and Nixon’s special counsel Charles Colson (i.e., Nixon’s “hatchet man”)
also helped organize the burglary.133 Krogh intended for the burglary to
uncover information from Ellsberg’s psychiatrist that could be used to
discredit Ellsberg. Krogh was sentenced to two to six years, served four and
a half months, and was disbarred.134 Colson pleaded guilty to obstruction
and served seven months.135 John Dean, Nixon’s White House Counsel, was
convicted of obstruction of justice and served 127 days of a one to four year
sentence.136 Nixon’s personal attorney, Herbert W. Kalmbach, raised
campaign funds illegally for legally questionable dark political ops for
Nixon.137 Kalmbach served six months in jail and lost his law license.138
Last but not least, G. Gordon Liddy, a former FBI lawyer and prosecutor,

129. See JAMES ROSEN, THE STRONG MAN 298–300 (2008).
130. Barnes, supra note 124.
131. Anthony Ripley, Kleindienst Admits Misdemeanor Guilt over Testimony in Senate on
I.T.T. Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1974, at 24, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/
timesmachine/1974/05/17/79659501.html [https://perma.cc/T4WY-9UVJ]. See generally
CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974); LEON JAWORSKI,
THE RIGHT AND THE POWER: THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE (1976); RICHARD
KLEINDIENST, JUSTICE: THE MEMOIRS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL RICHARD KLEINDIENST (1985).
132. Anthony Ripley, Federal Grand Jury Indicts 7 Nixon Aides on Charges of Conspiracy
on Watergate; Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell on List, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1974, at 1,
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/03/02/archives/federal-grand-jury-indicts-7-nixon-aides-oncharges-of-conspiracy.html [https://perma.cc/USS7-SLKA]; Key Players: John Ehrlichman,
WASH.
POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/watergate/
johnehrlichan.html [https://perma.cc/T958-ZLV3] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
133. Bob Woodward & Carl Bernstein, Break-In Memo Sent to Ehrlichman, WASH. POST
(June 13, 1973), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/
articles/061373-1.htm [https://perma.cc/444N-2VQU]. Daniel Ellsberg was the individual
who leaked the Pentagon Papers. See Kathleen Clark, The Legacy of Watergate for Legal
Ethics Instruction, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 673, 674 (2000).
134. In re Krogh, 536 P.2d 578, 578 (Wash. 1975).
135. See Clark, supra note 133, at 679 n.3.
136. See id. at 680 n.6.
137. Id. at 678 nn.10–11; Stephen Miller, Herbert Kalmbach, Nixon Lawyer Who Paid
‘Hush Money,’ Dies at 95, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-09-30/herbert-kalmbach-dies-95-nixon-lawyer-who-funneled-hush-money
[https://perma.cc/382D-ALKH] (noting that Kalmbach “paid ‘hush money’ to Watergate
burglars” and “served six months in prison for illegal fundraising activities”).
138. Clark, supra note 133, at 678, 680 n.11.
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organized the Watergate burglary itself and served over four years in
prison.139
Reagan’s first Attorney General, William French Smith, was not as
famously a partisan insider as Reagan’s second, Edwin Meese, but he was
still a buddy insider from Reagan’s early days in California politics.140 Smith
was a prominent lawyer in Los Angeles, atop the major firm Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher.141 Reagan and Smith met before Reagan’s 1966 campaign for
governor, and Smith became part of Reagan’s “kitchen cabinet,” his small
group of close advisors.142 Reagan appointed Smith to the University of
California Board of Regents in 1968, and Smith would go on to serve three
terms as chairman while also serving on the board of a number of major
corporations in California and nationally.143 He was a delegate representing
California in the Republican National Conventions of 1968, 1972, and 1976,
serving as the chairman of the delegation in 1968 and vice chairman in 1972
and 1976.144 Reagan, uncoincidentally, challenged President Gerald Ford
for the Republican nomination in 1976.145 When Reagan eventually won in
1980, he immediately brought Smith with him to Washington as his Attorney
General.146
Reagan’s second Attorney General was Edwin Meese, his close friend and
Chief of Staff during his governorship.147 Meese was also his 1980
presidential campaign’s senior official and transition head.148 As “counsellor
to the president,”149 Meese was deeply involved with political strategy and
outreach to the Evangelical community. His four years as Attorney General

139. Id. at 679, 681 n.19.
140. Edward J. Boyer, William French Smith, 73, Dies; Reagan Adviser and Atty. Gen.,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-10-30/local/me-3410_1_
william-french-smith [https://perma.cc/8379-5M3L] (“After meeting Reagan in 1963, Smith
became the future President’s personal lawyer, confidant and business adviser. He has been
credited with engineering Reagan’s rise to wealth at a time when the former actor’s primary
income was royalties from movies.”).
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. Attorney General: William French Smith, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ag/
bio/smith-william-french [https://perma.cc/B88L-TZBE] (last updated June 26, 2017).
144. Appointment of William French Smith as a Member of the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM (Feb. 28,
1985), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/22885b [https://perma.cc/446REU3W].
145. Lee Edwards, Ronald Reagan vs. Gerald Ford: The 1976 GOP Convention Battle
Royal, NAT’L INT. (Apr. 16, 2016), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ronald-reaganvs-gerald-ford-the-1976-gop-convention-battle-15818 [https://perma.cc/JR55-EYGK].
146. Attorney General: William French Smith, supra note 143.
147. See Attorney General: Edwin Meese, III, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ag/
bio/meese-edwin-iii [https://perma.cc/8N8A-PY2U] (last updated June 26, 2017).
148. Edwin Meese III, HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/staff/edwin-meese-iii
[https://perma.cc/DV8Z-HFVU] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
149. Id.
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were tainted by Iran-Contra questions, the Bechdel scandal, and the Wedtech
scandal, which led to his resignation in 1988.150
Since Meese, the trend shifted back to more professionals and politicos,
until George W. Bush appointed Alberto Gonzales to follow John
Ashcroft.151 Previously, Gonzales had served as general counsel to Bush,
and Bush elevated him to the Texas Supreme Court.152 After two years, he
resigned from the court to join the Bush administration as White House
counsel in 2001153 before Bush appointed him Attorney General in 2005.154
He played the central role in the partisan firing of U.S. attorneys, which led
to his resignation.155
President Trump’s first Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, fits more as the
established politician, but he was a campaign insider as well.156 He was the
first senator to endorse Trump, and his direct involvement with the campaign
affiliated him with Russia contacts that led to his recusal from the special
investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election.157
This overview of attorneys general who advanced through personal or
political connections is not meant to show that such backgrounds always lead
to corruption. They do not seem to. But it does show that norms of
independence of the DOJ from the president—either because of political
clout or professionalism—once existed but have eroded significantly.
Almost every president from FDR to Reagan appointed his campaign
manager or national party chairman to be Attorney General at some point,
and this problem has worsened.
Considering how these norms are crashing down all around us, what can
be done structurally to protect independence? Can Congress change those
structures—altering appointment powers, removal powers, or otherwise—to
restore independence more formally by statute?

150. See Atty. Gen. Meese Resigns: Says He’s Been Cleared and Leaves with Clean Name:
Acts After Prosecutor Files Report, L.A. TIMES (July 5, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/
1988-07-05/news/mn-5430_1_meese-resigns [https://perma.cc/L92S-7497].
151. Attorney General: Alberto R. Gonzales, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
ag/bio/gonzales-alberto-r [https://perma.cc/ZGV2-8FGH] (last updated June 26, 2017).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Steven Lee Myers & Philip Shenon, Embattled Attorney General Resigns, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 27, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/27/washington/27cnd-gonzales.html
[https://perma.cc/P9ER-9N4M].
156. See Eli Stokols, Sen. Jeff Sessions Endorses Trump, POLITICO (Feb. 28, 2016),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/sen-jeff-sessions-endorses-trump-219939
[https://perma.cc/XQ9V-7YZ5].
157. Kevin Johnson, Trump Fires Jeff Sessions, Names Matthew Whitaker as Interim
Attorney General, USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/2018/11/07/jeff-sessions-resigns-attorney-general-trump/512600001/
[https://perma.cc/2MCX-E3EU].
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II. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS
Independent agencies originated soon after the creation of the DOJ in
1870.158 Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in
1887, the first commission with staggered terms and protection from at-will
removal.159 The ICC became a model for independent agencies, which grew
in number during the Progressive Era and the New Deal.160
Could Congress apply some aspects of this model to the Office of the
Attorney General and the Department of Justice? Before considering the
details of those models, the first big-picture question is whether alternatives
are possible. Must the Department of Justice fit the unitary-executive
theory161 in terms of complete control by the president for appointing,
directing, and removal? Or can there be an alternative model consistent with
Article II of the Constitution?
The Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. Olson, upholding the
constitutionality of the Office of Independent Counsel by a 7-1 vote,162
indicates that the answer is yes. But today, many celebrate that lone dissent,
written by Justice Antonin Scalia, and hail it as one of the greatest dissents
in American history.163 The majority allowed Congress to create a
prosecutorial office as an inferior office, appointed and supervised by three
circuit judges, and protected from presidential removal.164 Justice Scalia
made a series of historical assertions about the unitary executive for all
prosecution and rejected the independent counsel structure.165 However,
Scalia’s dissent made a number of incorrect assumptions about American
history, which should be a fatal flaw on his own originalist terms.166 I do not
158. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 770–71 (2013); Jed Handelsman Shugerman,
The Dependent Origins of Independent Agencies: The Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Tenure of Office Act, and the Rise of Modern Campaign Finance, 31 J.L. & POL. 139, 142
(2014).
159. Datla & Revesz, supra note 158, at 776.
160. Id. at 771 & n.2, 772, 776–77.
161. See id. at 831–32 (explaining that the unitary-executive theory “holds that Article II
‘is a grant to the president of all of the executive power, which includes the power to remove
and direct all lower-level executive officials’” (quoting STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER
S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 3–4
(2008))); Peter M. Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 323, 324 (2016) (“Proponents of what I would call the ‘hard version’ of the unitary
executive thesis interpret the Constitution as guaranteeing the President plenary authorities,
which Congress may not limit, both to discharge unelected executive administrators at will
and to direct how they shall exercise any and all discretionary authority that those officials
possess under law.”).
162. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988). Justice Anthony Kennedy took no part
in the consideration or the decision of the case. Id. at 658.
163. See Terry Eastland, Scalia’s Finest Opinion, WKLY. STANDARD (Mar. 11, 2016),
https://www.weeklystandard.com/terry-eastland/scalias-finest-opinion
[https://perma.cc/
RRM3-KFP4].
164. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 655, 658, 661 n.3.
165. Id. at 727–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. I first published this historical argument in Slate. See Shugerman, supra note 14.
Some of the language in this paper is excerpted from this article. This conference paper does
not offer the complete historical argument, but I will be elaborating on it in a future article.
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present the full argument in this piece, but I simply summarize some key
points.167
Scalia’s core argument in his Morrison dissent was that “[g]overnment
investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive
function.”168 He continued: “We should say here that the President’s
constitutionally assigned duties include complete control over investigation
and prosecution of violations of the law, and that the inexorable command of
Article II is clear and definite: the executive power must be vested in the
President of the United States.”169
The Supreme Court has rejected the unitary model where administrative
officers exercise a mixed role of “quasi-judicial” or “quasi-legislative”
authority.170 This rule permits many vital independent agencies, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal Trade Commission, to
function with a significant degree of independence.171 But if prosecution has
historically been exclusively an executive power, the proponents of the
unitary executive contend that the president must have an unfettered power
to appoint, direct, and remove those officers at will.172 Historians have
demonstrated that this view simply was not true in the founding era.173
Scalia’s dissent in Morrison is simply inconsistent with his purportedly
originalist method.
First, for much of English and American history, most prosecution was not
an executive function at all because it was a private enterprise.174 In
England, the vast majority of criminal prosecution was by private parties, as
historians like John Langbein, Patrick Devlin, and many others have
explained.175 The vast majority of American prosecutions were still private
167. For more on opposing views on these questions and historical interpretations
presented in my summary and initial preview in this Part, please see Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994);
Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (2005); and see also
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, Remove Morrison v. Olson, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 103 (2009); and Stephanie A. J. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive
Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069 (1990).
168. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 710; see also Shugerman, supra note 14.
170. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690–91 (“[I]t was not essential to the President’s proper
execution of his Article II powers that [quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial] agencies be
headed up by individuals who were removable at will.”).
171. See id. at 687–88 (explaining that executive removal powers over officers of
independent agencies are not “illimitable” because such at-will removal exhibits “coercive
influence” that “would ‘threate[n] the independence of [the agencies]”).
172. Id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Governmental investigation and prosecution of
crimes is a quintessentially executive function.”).
173. Dangel, supra note 167, at 1070 (1990) (“An analysis of the Framers’
writings . . . shows that the Framers did not intend prosecution to be a core executive
function . . . . [The Framers] provided that most prosecution would be undertaken by officials
within the executive branch, but not necessarily executive officials subject to presidential
control through appointment, direction, and removal.”).
174. See Shugerman, supra note 7, at 129 (“A significant number of the prosecutions were
undertaken by private parties during [the founding era].”).
175. See John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 313, 317 (1973) (“For a very long time, really into the nineteenth century, the
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through the mid-nineteenth century, as Allen Steinberg and many other
historians have demonstrated.176 The rough consensus is that the public
prosecutor did not overtake private prosecution in America until after the
Civil War, and yet private prosecution continued deep into the twentieth
century.177 Even today, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Virginia, and Texas allow private citizens to serve a role in criminal
prosecutions.178
Second, Scalia hedged a bit by talking about “governmental”
prosecutions,179 but even this fallback position is inaccurate. Congressional
committees investigate crimes with subpoena power, and Congress has
authority to enforce these powers with its own legislative contempt
proceedings.180 Contempt of Congress is a criminal offense, and it has
historically been prosecuted entirely within the legislature.181
Third, historians have pointed out that the Judiciary Act of 1789 undercuts
Scalia further on his “governmental prosecution” claim.182 The statute in the
First Congress allowed deputy marshals to be removed by federal judges.183
English relied upon a predominant, although not exclusive, component of private
prosecution.”); Michael T. McCormack, Note, The Need for Private Prosecutors: An Analysis
of Massachusetts and New Hampshire Law, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 497, 500 n.27 (2004)
(“Devlin states that although any English citizen may prosecute, most choose to complain to
police and leave prosecution to them.” (citing PATRICK DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
IN ENGLAND 10 (1958))).
176. See Allen Steinberg, The “Lawman” in New York. William Travers Jerome and the
Origins of the Modern District Attorney in Turn-of-the-Century New York, 34 U. TOL. L. REV.
753, 753 (2003).
177. See Shugerman, supra note 7, at 129, 134.
178. See 234 PA. CODE § 506 (2018); State v. Rollins, 533 A.2d 331, 331 (N.H. 1987)
(stating that, in New Hampshire, “[t]he common law . . . does not preclude the institution and
prosecution of certain criminal complaints by private citizens”); State v. Storm, 661 A.2d 790,
792 (N.J. 1995) (holding that, in New Jersey, “whenever an attorney for a private party applies
to prosecute a complaint in the municipal court, the court should determine whether to permit
the attorney to proceed”); Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 871 (R.I. 2001)
(“[P]rivate misdemeanor prosecutions are valid in this jurisdiction.”); Hott v. Yarbrough, 245
S.W. 676, 678–79 (Tex. 1922) (“Equally clear is the right of any one who may consider
himself aggrieved by the actual or supposed commission of a crime to call the matter to the
attention of the grand jury for investigation and action. The law does not restrict the method
by which this may be done.”); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26 (Va. 1985)
(stating that, in Virginia, the common law “generally permits the appearance of private counsel
to assist the prosecution”).
179. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Governmental
investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.” (emphasis
added)).
180. Id. at 665 (majority opinion) (stating, while describing how the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978 functions, that when the House of Representatives subpoenaed an independent
agency, but the administrator of the agency withheld the subpoenaed documents, the House
voted to hold the administrator in contempt); see JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION:
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 175, 180 (2017).
181. See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 147–48 (1935).
182. See Dangel, supra note 173, at 1084 (“Although the final version of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 vested the appointment of the Attorney General in the President, an earlier draft
vesting this power in the Supreme Court indicates that its authors did not feel that presidential
appointment was constitutionally compelled.”).
183. See id.
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As Jennifer Mascott has explained, Congress designated for deputy marshals
an executive law enforcement role, and their removability by judges
“suggest[s] that the deputies had their own identity and their own measure of
accountability apart from the primary marshals.”184 At the same time,
Mascott also indicates that deputy marshals may have had more limited
subordinate roles, so until we know more about their function, we should not
rely too heavily on this one example.185
Even today, federal judges have the power to appoint interim U.S.
attorneys.186 The first draft of the Judiciary Act also would have given the
Supreme Court the power to appoint the Attorney General and gave district
judges the power to appoint district attorneys.187 These provisions were
deleted and not replaced, so their appointment reverted to the default under
the Constitution: presidential appointment.188 But the First Congress
showed in this draft that they did not think Scalia’s view was at all obvious,
settled, or quintessential.189 It certainly reflects that the role of the Attorney
General and the U.S. attorneys was unsettled and fluid in this period.190
Fourth, observers in the early republic indicated the federal judges
themselves led what appeared to be prosecutions during the Whiskey
Rebellion of 1794, and initiated prosecutions under the Alien and Sedition
Acts by convening and presiding over grand juries.191
Fifth, it is important to study what the states were doing at this time. The
states are usually important for understanding original public meaning in
order to provide context. But this is especially true for the question of law
enforcement because so much federal law enforcement depended directly on
184. Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “The Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV.
443, 518 (2018). Mascott also cites a statute indicating the deputy marshals had “powers” in
executing federal law. Id. at 518 n.435 (“[T]he marshals of the several districts and their
deputies, shall have the same powers in executing the laws of the United States, as sheriffs
and their deputies in the several states have by law, in executing the laws of their respective
states.” (quoting Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 9, 1 Stat. 264, 265 (repealed 1795))).
185. For more on these roles, see FREDERICK S. CALHOUN, THE LAWMEN: UNITED STATES
MARSHALS AND THEIR DEPUTIES, 1789–1989, at 21 (1989); Aditya Bamzai, The Constitutional
Status of “Deputy” Officers, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Apr. 16, 2018),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-constitutional-status-of-deputy-officers-by-aditya-bamzai/
[https://perma.cc/QN8L-GRFA]. For more on these debates, see generally Ilan Wurman,
Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359 (2017).
186. 28 U.S.C. § 546(d) (2012).
187. See Dangel, supra note 173, at 1086.
188. Id. at 1084–85.
189. Id. at 1085 (“[T]he Framers did not view presidential appointment of prosecutors as
the obvious choice.”); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Governmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially
executive function.” (emphasis added)).
190. For the best resource, see generally ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON
THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992). For other resources, see also JULIUS
GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 490 (1971); Charles Warren, New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 108–09 (1923).
191. MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON
TRIAL 12–13 (1977); Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Nov. 19, 1794),
in ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE NATION 491, 491 (Richard B. Morris
ed., 1957).
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the states.192 The federal government had a minor role in criminal law in this
era.193 In some cases, Congress used criminal fines to achieve its limited
regulatory goals, but it relied heavily on state officials and state courts, as
well as private plaintiffs.194 When Congress used criminal fines to enforce
the Embargo Act of 1807, the government found that it had too few district
attorneys, with too little time, to prosecute offenders, and the embargo was
made a mockery.195
State constitutions reflect how the founding generation understood the role
of law enforcement and how it actually enforced the law. They adopted
separate branches and often declared a separation of powers explicitly, unlike
the federal Constitution.196 Nevertheless, many state constitutions did not
reflect Scalia’s formalism. Early state constitutions sometimes placed
attorneys general and prosecutors under the judiciary article or judicial
sections of their constitutions.197 These constitutions grouped attorneys
general together with judges and judicial officers.198 These practices
continued in many new frontier states established from the 1790s through the
1830s.199 Moreover, some of the constitutions assigned the power of
appointment of law enforcement officials to the legislature with no role for
the governor, and some assigned this appointment power to judges.200
192. Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons
from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 281 (1989) (“Despite the executive branch’s leading
part, Congress, the courts, private citizens, and state officials have played significant
supporting roles in federal criminal law enforcement.”).
193. Id.
194. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 83 (2012).
195. Id. at 93, 101.
196. PROTECTIONS IN THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION BEYOND THE FEDERAL BILL OF
RIGHTS 5 (Scott N. Fein & Andrew B. Ayers eds., 2017).
197. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. ch. II, § 1, art. IX (describing restrictions on the office of
“Attorney-General” as well as various state judgeships).
198. See, e.g., id. This includes Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey, and North Carolina;
similarly, Maryland’s Constitution did not have specific articles and grouped the prosecutors
with the judges. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. III, § 3 (establishing “a State’s Attorney and
Solicitors” separately from the state judiciary).
199. These states are Tennessee, Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. See, e.g.,
LA. CONST. of 1812, art. IV, § 7.
200. These states include New Hampshire, Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, New
York, Tennessee, and Georgia. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. III, § 4. There was another
alternative in appointing an expanding system of public prosecutors:
In 1777, New York created a Council on Appointments, which consisted of the
governor and an annually rotating panel of four senators. The Council appointed all
state officers, including justices of the peace, district attorneys, and sheriffs. The
Council was designed to limit the governor’s control over the state bureaucracy, and
also to limit popular democracy. From 1777 to 1821, the Council appointed 15,000
officers. It was heavily criticized, but if it had been designed better, I am curious if
it could have been a successful model for a less partisan method of building a
prosecutorial system. It certainly could have been a foundation for a more
consensus-oriented, professionally-based system, as the council could have evolved
to change the council membership but not the basic structure. On the other hand,
any method of appointment might have succumbed to the Jacksonian democratic
wave.
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For example, Virginia’s 1776 Constitution—drafted by James Madison,
George Mason, and other key figures of the founding—gave the governor the
power to appoint justices of the peace but gave the legislature the power to
appoint attorneys general and gave judges the power to appoint sheriffs,
coroners, and constables.201 These founders did not share Scalia’s
assumptions.
For those who are skeptical of originalism, this history of prosecution may
confirm how difficult it is to discern clear, stable interpretive binding
meaning from nuanced, complicated, and multifaceted sources and practices.
For those who subscribe to original public meaning, this history shows that
the design of the executive branch is far more open-ended than many
ostensible originalists have claimed.
III. STRUCTURAL INDEPENDENCE FOR QUASI-JUDICIAL DOJ OFFICERS?
In 1870, Congress created the DOJ to reduce the partisan patronage in
hiring government lawyers and to professionalize government lawyers.202
Following the corruption scandals of the 1870s, Congress passed the
Pendleton Act of 1883 to establish the civil service in the executive branch
for lower bureaucratic appointments.203 A few years later, Congress created
the ICC, the model for independent agencies with job security and staggered,
long terms, that proliferated through the twentieth century.204 This wave of
professional reform laid a foundation for independence from partisans in the
executive branch, but these reforms were limited in their scope and extent.205
It is time to debate whether to elevate these reforms into the upper echelons
of the DOJ, from the Attorney General down to the U.S. attorneys. This Part
offers an initial set of thoughts and proposals to suggest some structural
reforms that I will elaborate in future work in more detail.
Myers v. United States206 held that Congress cannot limit presidential
power to remove executive officials.207 But the equally canonical precedent
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States208 distinguishes executive offices
from “quasi-judicial” and “quasi-legislative” offices.209 As noted in the
introduction, the office of U.S. Attorney General has often been called
“quasi-judicial” (or recognized as having “quasi-judicial” features) long

Jed Shugerman, The Founding of the DOJ and the Failure of Civil Service Reform, 1865–
1870, AM. B. FOUND., at 10, http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/
shugerman_doj_and_civil_service.doc [https://perma.cc/TV4M-7W2T] (last visited Mar. 15,
2019).
201. VA. CONST. of 1776.
202. See Shugerman, supra note 7, at 122.
203. See Shugerman, supra note 200, at 32.
204. Shugerman, supra note 158, at 144–45.
205. Id.
206. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
207. Id. at 159.
208. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
209. Id. at 624.
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before Humphrey’s Executor.210 This was Attorney General Caleb
Cushing’s frequently cited formulation. Attorney General Edward Bates
similarly wrote, “The office I hold is not properly political, but strictly legal;
and it is my duty, above all other ministers of State to uphold the Law and to
resist all encroachments, from whatever quarter, of mere will and power.”211
Other parts of the DOJ are quasi-judicial, such as the Office of Legal Counsel
and the Solicitor General.
Thus, if the Attorney General and parts of the DOJ are quasi-judicial, they
might be structurally removed from unitary control, so long as the structure
does not intrude upon or obstruct the president’s duty to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. In Humphrey’s Executor, the Court held
unanimously:
The authority of Congress, in creating quasi legislative or quasi judicial
agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently
of executive control cannot well be doubted; and that authority includes, as
an appropriate incident, power to fix the period during which they shall
continue in office, and to forbid their removal except for cause in the
meantime. For it is quite evident that one who holds his office only during
the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of
independence against the latter’s will.212

Thus, Congress could take parts of the DOJ and refashion them in the model
of independent commissions or other reforms, fixing the terms and
forbidding their removal except for cause.
If one of the core problems is the crony-ization of the Office of Attorney
General itself, can that office be redesigned for more independence? Could
Congress forbid the removal of the Attorney General from office except for
cause? Lower courts have confronted the problem of a single head of an
agency who can be removed only for cause. In PHH Corp. v. CFPB,213 the
D.C. Circuit first held that a single head cannot have such insulation because
it concentrates too much executive power in one person separate from
presidential control.214 The D.C. Circuit then reheard the case en banc and
upheld the structure.215 The CFPB appears to be more quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial than the DOJ, or at least judges are more likely to distinguish
them. It is likely that courts would find such insulation of the Attorney
General to interfere with the president’s executive power under the Vesting
Clause and his or her duties under the Take Care Clause.216 Too much

210. See CUSHING REPORT, supra note 2, at 6; see also Cushing Opinion, supra note 2, at
334. Cushing also noted that Congress established the Office of Attorney General “in
organizing the judicial business of the United States.” Cushing Opinion, supra note 2, at 330.
211. Arthur Selwyn Miller, The Attorney General as the President’s Lawyer, in ROLES OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 41, 51 (Luther A. Huston et al. eds., 1968).
212. Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 629.
213. 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d on reh’g, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
214. Id. at 8.
215. See generally PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
216. See, e.g., id.
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executive power would be concentrated in an insulated principal officer.
Such a proposal seems unlikely to survive a challenge.
Could the Office of the Attorney General be turned into a commission with
staggered terms to avoid the concentration problem in PHH? Could the
Attorney General be turned into an Attorneys’ Commission, or a Justice
Commission with staggered terms? Article II does not explicitly forbid such
a structure, but it might implicitly. The Appointment Clause states:
“Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments.”217 A “head” of a department might not be limited to a
single person, but it depends how one reads “head.” It is unclear if a “head”
of a department ever meant multiple people in England or at the American
founding, and no department today is headed by a commission, even if there
are many independent agencies under those departments. It is plausible to
imagine such a commission of attorneys general with staggered terms. But
it is more plausible that federal courts would find that this design violates
Article II. In any case, the lesson from commissions is that an even number
of commissioners leads to paralysis, so such a structure would probably need
to be an odd number of commissioners to make sure the president can take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Given the constitutional challenges that likely await such a novel design
of department leadership, perhaps it makes more sense to focus on more
plausible designs. Congress could retain the single Attorney General who
serves at will, but other principal officers could be turned into a bipartisan
staggered commission under the Attorney General, with the protection of forcause removal. Principal officers can be given such job security.218 Instead
of a hierarchy of a Deputy Attorney General, an Associate Attorney General,
and Assistant Attorneys General as heads of DOJ offices, imagine a Justice
Commission under the Attorney General. The Attorney General and perhaps
the Deputy Attorney General would remain from the old unitary structure,
but they would join a commission of Assistant Attorneys General who
supervise the offices. Because these are principal offices, the President
would have to nominate and the Senate confirm them.219 But a statute could
require bipartisan membership. The terms also could be staggered and set
for a number of years to have crossovers from an earlier administration.
One possible structure that would avoid interfering with the executive
power would be members who serve five-year terms removable only for
cause. Each president gets to name one at the beginning of his or her term,
and then a new one each year. Let us imagine that there are five Assistant
Attorneys General who are part of this independent structure and rotation,
but there are four additional members who also sit and vote on the
217. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
218. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 534–
36 (2010).
219. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659–60 (1997); cf. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S.
Ct. 2044, 2056 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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commission: the Attorney General, a Deputy Attorney General, and two
Associate Attorneys General. From the beginning of every presidential term,
the president will have named five of the nine members—a majority. But
one of those new appointees will be an assistant with job security, and thus
may be more free to be a swing vote, a conscience on the committee, and
perhaps a whistleblower. After that first year, the president gradually
increases his or her majority. One key point is that the commission would
always hold over from the previous administration to at least be a possible
check on the DOJ, cronyism, or election-year rigging. That is why the terms
would be five years. Putting someone on the inside of the DOJ from the
opposing party is important even if his or her vote has limited power in the
minority.
Even less complicated is the possibility of creating independent
commissions within the DOJ that do not include the Attorney General.220
The Office of Legal Counsel is more than quasi-judicial. It is self-conceived
as almost-judicial. It has a norm of following precedent substantively, so
perhaps that norm could be reinforced with staggered terms and entrenched
officers from the last administration. One can imagine the Solicitor General
being turned into an independent Solicitors’ Commission to similar effect,
which would encourage a more judicious, reliable, and consistent approach
to cases. It would be slightly more difficult for the Solicitor General to
reverse earlier positions if there are holdovers from a previous
administration. The rule of law benefits from more consistency and from
having a different perspective in the room to challenge ideological thinking.
There are other offices that could be recreated following such an
independent model, such as the Office of Legal Policy or the Office of
Legislative Affairs. The DOJ’s Inspectors General have been praised for
their independence and their role as watchdogs, and that norm can be
reinforced structurally with job security.221 The structure of the FBI reflects
a part of the independence model. The director may be removed at will, as
we now know, of course, but the director is appointed to a ten-year term.222
The Inspectors General should have similarly long terms. But to be clear,
the FBI may arguably be less appropriate for additional job security because
its role is less quasi-judicial and more investigatory and executive.
Another possible reform is outside of Main Justice. A statute could protect
the U.S. attorneys from presidential removal at will. Instead, they could be
removable only for cause. This reform would limit the president’s power to
dictate law enforcement and prosecution, but it would acknowledge the
220. For more on these themes, see generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:
Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006); and
Andrew Kent, Congress and the Independence of Federal Law Enforcement, 52 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
221. See Jack Goldsmith, Independence and Accountability at the Department of Justice,
LAWFARE (Jan. 30, 2018, 2:16 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/independence-andaccountability-department-justice [https://perma.cc/DX6Y-35YQ].
222. See 28 U.S.C. § 532 note (2012) (Findings).
OF THE

1994

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

expectations of judicious and independent decision-making by prosecutors a
bit more insulated from partisan pressures. Recall Alberto Gonzales and the
2006 firing scandal.223 These reforms might frustrate a president, but that is
the price of protecting prosecutorial fairness and independence from political
pressures and partisanship.
CONCLUSION
“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”224
Officers take an oath to “faithfully execute” their offices.225 Our current
structures and norms of partisanship, self-dealing, and cronyism are not
conducive to faithful execution. This historical overview of the Office of the
Attorney General shows the erosion of the norms of professionalism and
independence and a growing threat to the rule of law. But the history of the
founding era was less rigid and formal about executive power and
institutional design, which also suggests that we can be more flexible and
creative about the design of these offices and the DOJ today. Congress
should borrow from the independent commission-independent agency model
to reinforce those norms and to restore professionalism, structural
independence, and the impartial rule of law.

223. As I have discussed in a draft excerpt from my forthcoming book:
In 2006, around the same time as the Nifong/Duke scandal, eight federal U.S.
Attorneys were relieved of their duties, too. A report by the Inspector General of
the Justice Department concluded that “there was significant evidence that political
partisan considerations were an important factor” in the firings. The allegations are
that the Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and other White House officials fired
three prosecutors for investigating Republican politicians, two others were fired for
not investigating Democratic politicians, and a sixth, then-New Jersey U.S. Attorney
Chris Christie . . . avoided his firing by investigating Democrat Robert Menendez
towards the end of his Senate Campaign (an investigation that resulted in no
charges). Christ[ie] became governor three years later.
Also in 2006, U.S. Attorney Steven Biskupic prosecuted Georgia Thompson, a
career civil servant in Wisconsin for allegedly steering a state contract to a travel
agency owned by supporters of Democratic Governor Jim Doyle. Thompson’s
conviction for mail fraud and misapplication of federal funds became a centerpiece
in the Republican campaign against Doyle. A year later, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals overturned the conviction, finding that the prosecution’s case was
“preposterous” and without evidence, that the agency had submitted the lowest bid,
that there was “not so much of a whiff of impropriety,” and that Thompson was
“innocent.” The Court ordered her immediate release. It turns out that, in 2005,
U.S. Attorney Biskupic had been on a list of U.S. Attorneys to be considered for
firing, compiled by the U.S. Attorney General’s chief of staff for not bringing voter
fraud cases against Democrats. After Biskupic indicted Thompson, his name came
off of that list.
JED SHUGERMAN, THE RISE OF THE PROSECUTOR-POLITICIANS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4
n.9).
224. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
225. For more on this argument, see Kent et al., supra note 15; and Ethan J. Leib & Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Two Legal Conclusions, GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3177968 [https://perma.cc/85QT-9S7R].

